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1INTRODUCTION
Our purpose here is to report aresult obtained in Yamazaki and Ichiishi
(2002) on the incentive compatible core of aBayesian pure exchange econ-
omy with acontinuum of population. Ageneral economic model with differ-
ential information was introduced by Radner (1968), and R. Wilson (1978)
in his seminal paper introduced and analyzed several core concepts in afinite
economy with differential information. It was shown that :
$\bullet$ Acontract in the (interim) core exists if information is not shared
among economic agents;
$\bullet$ However if information is shared among economic agents, then the core
may be empty.
In this setup contracts are executed before the prevailing information state
becomes known to economic agents. Thus, in order for acontract to be
executed exactly as is written on it, it is necessary that the incentive com-
patibility condition is imposed on the contract. It should be apart of the
feasibility conditions of acontract.
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It was $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}$ wn by Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) that if utility functions are affine
linear, acontract in the incentive compatible interim core exists. However,
R. Vohra (1999) showed that if utility functions are not affine linear, then the
incentive compatible interim core may be empty. The basis of an intrinsic
difficulty of existence of an incentive compatible core contract is that the
imposition of the incentive compatibility introduces anonconvexity of feasible
sets of contracts. For this reason B. Allen (1999) turned to an economy with
acontinuum population \‘a la Aumann (1966) and showed that the incentive
compatible core is nonempty if there are only finite number of utility types
each of which is strictly concave, $C^{1}$ , differentiably strictly monotone, and
satisfies aboundary and aregularity condition, and if the income (or wealth)
distribution arising from the initial endowment allocation of the economy is
diffused in the sense employed by Yamazaki (1978). The Allen’s proof seems
to have been made complicated by the fact that the incentive compatibility
condition is imposed on individual consumption sets, resulting in nonconvex
consumption sets of aspecific kind. Our observation is that when there are
only finitely many utility types, there is away to circumvent adifficulty
introduced by the incentive compatibility condition without appealing to the
diffusion of endowment distribution.
2MODEL
2.1 Large Bayesian Population and Information Struc-
tures
Let $(A, A, \nu)$ be an atomless measure space (with $\nu(A)=1$ ) of economic
agents expressing acontinuum of population in alarge economy as in Au-
mann (1966) and Hildenbrand(1974). Sets $S$ in $A$ with positive measures are
called coalitions. Let $T^{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $\Gamma^{n}$ be afinite number of agents’ type sets. Each
$T^{i}$ , $i=1$ , $\ldots$ , $m$ , is assumed to be nonempty and finite. $I=\{1, \ldots, m\}$ will
denote the finite set of indices of type sets of economic agents. At aparticu-
lar stage of the economic activities agent $a\in A$ of type $j$ alone knows which
member of the set $T^{j}$ is truly realized; in this sense the realized member $t^{j}$
is called the private information of agent $a$ of type $j.1$
Elements of set $T^{j}$ are types. However, with an abuse of words, we will sometimes
follow aconvention to callj $\in I$ atype of agents to avoid acumbersome wording. Precisely
speaking, $j\in I$ is an index of sets of types of agents.
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For $J\subset I$ . define $T^{J}:= \prod_{j\in J}T^{j}$ and $T:=T^{I}$ for simplicity. $T$ is the set
of possible type profiles and ageneric element $t\in T$ is called atype profile.
It is also called an information state in the sense that it is aprofile of private
information possessed by economic agents.
The $ex$ ante period is defined as the period in which each player does
not have his private information, but has an $ex$ ante probability on the type
profiles $T$ , subjective or objective. An interim period is defined as aperiod
in which each agent already has his private information but does not know
the true type profile. The $ex$ post period is defined as the period in which
everybody knows the true type profile.
INFORMATION AND A SEQUENCE





Contracts $\mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{o}^{\mathrm{T}}}\circ \mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ Contracts Execution(Consumption)
Given private information $t^{j}$ , agent $a$ of type $j$ holds his subjective prob-
utility $\pi^{j}(\cdot|t^{j})$ on the type profiles of other types $T^{I\backslash \{j\}}$ . Some works
have an $ex$ ante probability as agiven datum, but here we take interim
probabilities as given data. It is not necessary to assume that it is derived
from an ex ante probability $\pi^{j}$ on $T$ by the Bayes rule, $\pi^{j}(t^{I\backslash \{j\}}|t^{j})=$
$r_{\mathfrak{l}}^{j}(t^{I\backslash \{j\}}, t^{j})/\pi^{j}(T^{I\backslash \{j\}}\cross\{t^{j}\})$ .
In addition to the type set $T^{j}$ , associated with each index $j\in I$ of type
sets are atype-profile dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
$u^{j}$ : $\mathbb{R}_{+}^{\ell}\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}$ and type $j’ \mathrm{s}$ initial endowment vector, $e^{j}$ : $T^{j}arrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{\ell}|$ , which
depends only upon type $j’ \mathrm{s}$ information state $t^{j}$ .
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For $J\subset I$ the set $T^{J}$ gives rise to the partition of $T:\{\{t^{J}\}\cross T^{I\backslash J}|t^{J}\in$
$T^{J}\}$ . Denote by $\mathcal{T}^{J}$ the algebra on $T$ generated by this partition, and set
$\mathcal{T}^{j}:=\mathcal{T}^{\{j\}}$ . We call $\mathcal{T}^{j}$ the private information structure of agent of type $j$ .
Wilson (1978) pioneered study of the core of apure exchange economy
with incomplete information and afinite population, in which he emphasized
the role of revelation of private information. For an expository purpose of
this paragraph and the next, assume for amoment that the set I is the finite
population of economic agents rather than afinite set of types of agents.
When agent $j$ is endowed only with his private information structure, he can
distinguish two states (i.e., two type profiles), $t$ and $t’$ , iff there exists an event
$E\in \mathcal{T}^{j}$ such that $t\in E$ and $t’\not\in E$ . Likewise, when coalition $J$ is formed
and each member some how fully reveals his information to his colleagues,
any member of $J$ can distinguish two states using the pooled information
structure $\mathcal{T}^{J}$ . In general, each member $j$ receives only partial information
from his colleagues, so the information structure he can use is an algebra $S^{j}$
which is finer than his private information structure but is coarser than the
fully pooled information structure.
We have followed Harsanyi (1967/1968) in formulating information struc-
tures as algebras on the type profile space $T$ . Atype profile is astate of the
nature. Actually, Wilson (1978) and many subsequent authors took amore
general approach in which an arbitrary probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{T},\pi)$ is given
to describe the possible states of the nature, and an arbitrary subalgebra $\mathcal{T}^{j}$
of $\mathcal{T}$ is also given to describe agent $j’ \mathrm{s}$ private information structure, $j\in I$ .
Harsanyi’s type profile framework $( \Omega=\prod_{j\in I}T^{j})$ treats the case of extreme
asymmetry of information that private information structures T.
$\cdot$
and $\mathcal{T}^{j}$ are
uncorrelated for different agents $i$ and $j$ ($\tau:\cap \mathcal{T}^{j}=\{\emptyset,T\}$ if $i\neq j$ ), but
Wilson’s general approach allows for correlation, that is $\mathcal{T}^{i}\cap \mathcal{T}^{j}$ may can
tain nonempty proper subsets of $\Omega$ . For the expository purpose, however, we
adopt the type profile framework in this paper.
Alarge Bayesian (exchange) economy
$\mathcal{E}=(\theta:(A, A, \nu) arrow I, \{\mathbb{R}_{+}^{\ell},T^{j}, \pi^{j},u^{j}, e^{j}\}_{j\in I})$
is an economy with $l$ commodities, where 0: $Aarrow I$ is ameasurable map-
ping indicating type indices of agents in the economy, $(A,A, \nu)$ an atomless
population of economic agents, I afinite set of agents’ type indices, and
for each agent $a$ , $\mathbb{R}_{+}^{\ell}$ is his consumption set, $T_{a}:=T^{\theta(a)}$ his finite type
set, $u_{a}:=u^{\theta(a)}$ : $\mathbb{R}_{+}^{\ell}\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}$ his type-profile dependent von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function which is continuous and locally nonsatiated for
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any $t$ in $T$ , $e(a, \cdot):=e^{\theta(a)}$ :
$T..arrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}=\pi^{\theta(a}1$
$\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{j}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\prime \mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$
depends only on $t^{\theta(a)}$ , and $\pi_{a}$
$T^{-\theta(a)}$ where, for any $j$ , $T$ may be written as $T=T^{j}\cross T^{-j}$ . Note that
the measurability of 0: $Aarrow I$ and the finiteness of I imply that $e(\cdot, t)$ is
$A$-integrable for all $t\in T$ .
For each $j\in I$ , let $A^{j}=\theta^{-1}(j)(=\{a\in A|\theta(a)=j\})$ . We assume that
each type $j\in I$ is present in the economy:
Assumption 2.1 $(\forall j\in I)$ $\nu(A^{j})>0$ , and $\nu(\bigcup_{j\in I}A^{j})=1$ .
For any coalition $S$ in $A$ , define $I(S)=\{j\in I|\nu(S\cap A^{j})>0\}$ . $I(S)$
is the set of types of agents belonging to coalition $S$ . For $S\in A$ , define
$\tau_{S}[perp]$ $:=T^{I(S)}(= \prod_{j\in I(S)}T^{j})$;then, we have $T_{A}=T^{I(A)}=T^{I}=T$ . The private
information structures for individuals $a\in A$ is given by:
$\mathcal{T}_{a}:=\mathcal{T}^{\theta(a)}(=\{\{t^{\theta(a)}\}\cross\prod_{j\in I\backslash \{\theta(a)\}}T^{j}|t^{\theta(a)}\in T^{\theta(a)}\})$
Let us define $\mathcal{T}_{S}$ also for acoalition $S$ by $\mathcal{T}_{\mathrm{S}}:=\mathcal{T}^{I(S)}$ which is the algebra on
$T$ generated by the partition $\{\{t^{I(S)}\}\cross T^{I\backslash I(S)}|t^{I(S)}\in T^{I(S)}\}$ .
2.2 Contracts on Trades in aBayesian Economy
Contracts
Let $\mathcal{E}=$ $(\theta : (A, A, \nu)arrow I, \{\mathbb{R}_{+}^{\ell}, T^{j}, \pi^{j}, u^{j}, e^{j}\}_{j\in I})$ be alarge Bayesian (ex-
change) economy. We are interested in contracts on trades among economic
agents in this economy. We assume that acontract is agreed upon at interim
stage, and is executed before prevailing information state $t\in T$ becomes
known to everyone. This means that trades and resulting consumptions will
take place in general without acomplete knowledge of $t$ . (See Figure 1.)
Acontract (on trades) in $\mathcal{E}$ is amapping $x:A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ such that $x(\cdot, t)$
is $A$-integrable for every $t\in T$ . Three kinds of feasibility requirement are
placed on contracts. The first is their resource feasibility.
Acontract $x:A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is exactly feasible for $S\in A$ if we have
$\int_{S}x(\cdot, t)d\nu=0$
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for every $t\in T^{2}$. It is exactly feasible if it is exactly feasible for $A$ .
The second feasibility requirement is concerned with the discernability of
conditions of acontract by individual agents. Acontract $x$ : $A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is
called aprivate information contract if $x(a, \cdot)$ is $\mathcal{T}_{a}$-measurable $\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{e}$ . $a\in A$ .
If acontract is aprivate information contract, then any agent can carry
out trades required on his part by the contract on the basis of his own
information.
For any $t=$ $(t^{1}, \ldots,t^{j}, \ldots,\mathrm{t}\mathrm{m})\in T$ , $j=1$ , $\ldots$ , $m$ , we write $t=(t^{j},t^{-j})\in$
$T^{j}\cross T^{-j}$ . Given acontract $x:A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ , define for each $a\in A$
$x(a,t,T_{a}):=\{z \in \mathbb{R}^{\ell}|(\exists\#^{\theta(a)}\in \mathrm{I}^{\theta(a)})z=x_{S}(a, (d^{\theta(a)}, t^{-\theta(a)})\}$ .
The third feasibility requirement is concerned with the feasibility of execution
of acontract. Acontract $x:A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is incentive compatible in $S\in A$ if
$(\forall z_{a}\in x(a,t, T_{a}))Eu_{a}(x(a, t)+e(a,t)|t^{\theta(a)})\geq Eu_{a}(z_{a} +\mathrm{e}(\mathrm{a}, t)|t^{\theta(a)})$
$\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{e}$ . $a\in S$ for all $t\in T$ . Acontract $x$ : $A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is incentive compatible
if it is incentive compatible in $A$ . An incentive compatible contract does not
give incentives for agents to engage in trades which are not in accordance
with the agreement of the contract just because others might not be able to
catch him of breaching the contract. In this sense its execution is feasible if
it is incentive compatible.
Incentive Compatible Core
Apair $(S,x_{S})$ consisting of acoalition $S\in A$ (with $\nu(S)>0$) and an exactly
feasible contract for $S$ , $x_{S}$ : $A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is an objection to another private
information contract $x:A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ if :
(a) $E(u_{a}(x_{S}(a,t)+e(a,t))|t\dot{.}(a))\geq E(u_{a}(x(a, t)+e(a,t))|t_{i(a)})\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{e}$.
$a\in S$ ;
(b) $E(u_{a}(x_{S}(a, t)+e(a, t))|t_{i(a)})>E(u_{a}(x(a,t)+e(a,t))|t_{i(a)})$ on a
subset $S’\subset S$ with apositive measure.
$2\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}$ the literature some of the existing works adopt aweaker form of resource feasibil-
ity allowing an inequality in the definition of resource feasibility. If there are economic
agents to whom some of the commodities are “bads” in the sense that an increase in their
consumption decreases their utility level in some range of their consumption levels, then
from an economic point of view it is important to require the exact resource feasibility.
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An objection (S,$x_{S})$ is aprivate infor mation objection if xs : $A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$
is $T_{a}$-measurable a.e. a $\in S$ . It is an incentive compatible objection if $x_{S}$ :
$A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is incentive compatible in S.
Definition 2.1 [Incentive Compatible Core] An exactly feasible incentive
compatible private information contract $x:A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is said to be in the
incentive compatible core of the Bayesian economy if there are no incentive
compatible private information objections to the contract $x$ .
3Statement of aResult
VVe would like to report an existence result which shows that the interim
incentive compatible core is nonempty without assuming affine linearity nor
quasiconcavity of utility functions of individual agents. Moreover, we allow
commodities to be regarded as bads by many agents. However, what we
require is that for each commodity there is apositive weight of agents who
regard the commodity to be desirable.
Let us now give aprecise statement. Commodity $i\in\{1, \ldots, l\}$ is called
adesirable commodity for $u^{j}$ if one has
$(\forall t\in T)(\forall x\in \mathbb{R}_{+}^{\ell})(\exists k>0)u^{j}(x+k\iota_{i},t)$ $>u^{j}(x,\mathrm{t})$
where $\iota_{i}$ is the $i$-th unit vector.
Theorem 1Let $\mathcal{E}=$ $(\theta : (A, A, \nu) arrow I, \{\mathbb{R}_{+}^{\ell}, T^{j}, \tau_{\mathrm{I}}^{j}, u^{j}, e^{j}\}_{j\in I})$ be a large
Bayesian economy. $Then_{f}$ there exists a private information contract that
belongs to the incentive compatible core if the given Bayesian economy $\mathcal{E}$
satisfies the following conditions:
(a) For each commodity $i$ there is $j\in I$ such that commodity $i$ is $a$
desirable commodity for $u^{j}$ .
(b) For all $\mathrm{t}$ $\in T,$ $e(a, t)\in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{\ell}a.e$ . $a\in A$ .
Aproof of this theorem is given in Yamazaki and Ichiishi (2002). Here, we
briefly describe steps of its proof. The theorem is proved as aconsequence of
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three propositions. The first step is to define an interim price equilibrium in
such away that corresponding equilibrium contracts belong to the incentive
compatible core. Since the main objective is to establish the nonemptiness of
the incentive compatible core, it is not necessary to have areasonable ground
for such an equilibrium to be established in competitive markets.
The notion of an interim exact price equilibrium contract to be used is
as defined below:
Definition 3.2 [Interim Exact Price Equilibrium Contract] Acontract
$x$ : $A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is an interim exact price equilibrium contract if there is
$p:Tarrow \mathrm{R}^{\ell}\backslash \{0\}$ such that:
(a) x: $A\cross T$ $arrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is exactly feasible;
(b) x: $A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is aprivate information contract;
(c) $(\forall t\in T)x(a,t)$ maximizes $E(u_{a}(z+e(a, t))|t_{i(a)})$ subject to
$p(t)\cdot z\leq 0$ , $\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{e}$ . $a\in A$ .
Then, one can easily check the following result:
Proposition 1Given a large Bayesian economy $\mathcal{E}_{f}$ an interim exact price
contract belongs to the incentive core.
The second step is to adopt the idea of Hahn and Yannelis (1997) and to
show that their result showing that an exactly feasible contract on trades is
incentive compatible if it is aprivate information contract can be extended
to alarge economy with acontinuum of agents if there are only finitely many
types.
Proposition 2In a large Bayesian economy $\mathcal{E}_{f}$ a private information con-
tract $x:A\cross Tarrow \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$ is incentive compatible if it satisfies:
$\int_{A}x(\cdot, \mathrm{t})d\nu=\mathit{0}$
for every $t\in T$ .
The last but an essential step is to establish the existence of an interim
exact price contract. For this we appeal to arecent result on the existence of
aWalrasian equilibrium in alarge economy by Hara and Yamazaki (2002)
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Proposition 3Given a large Bayesian economy $\mathcal{E}_{f}$ there exists an interim
exact price contract if it satisfies the following conditions:
(a) For each commodity $i$ there is $j\in I$ such that commodity $i$ is $a$
desirable commodity for $u^{j}$ .
(b) For all $\mathrm{t}$ $\in T_{f}e(a,t)\in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathit{1}}a.e$ . $a\in A$ .
We would like to note that the above proposition 3is not implied by
the fundamental Walrasian equilibrium existence results of Aumann (1966)
and Schmeidler (1969) because utility functions need not be monotonic for
all agents, nor the results of Hildenbrand $(1970, 1974)$ because contracts or
allocations must be exactly feasible. In this respect, one may also note that
in asetup of economic agents with preferences which are locally nonsatiated
but not necessarily monotonic (so that some of the commodities are “bads”)
such as in Hildenbrand (1970), an equilibrium may fail to exist unless the
free disposability of unwanted commodities is assumed.
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